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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Although various aspects of government borrowing have received much 
attention in the literature, relatively little focus has been placed on 
borrowing by governments on the local level. More academic interest in the 
study of public debt in the local government setting has arisen in light of 
the continued fiscal plight of local governments especially in the metro­
politan areas. The recent problems in these areas, such as New York City, 
have served as an impetus for renewed interest and research in the debt 
position of local governments. 
Public sector debt is, of course, interrelated with other aspects of 
local government finance. It is closely related to the basic government 
fiscal flows of taxation and spending. The changes in these segments of 
local government finance over time have contributed to the fiscal plight of 
U.S. cities. On the one hand, expenditures for most municipalities have 
been increasing rapidly; while on the other hand, tax revenues for cities 
have tended to lag. 
The increases in expenditures stem from numerous sources such as high 
unemployment rates in cities, large portions of the urban population on 
public assistance, increased demand for better public services, changes in 
the age composition of metropolitan populations, increased wages of city 
employees, and inflation. Total government expenditures for cities 
increased 103% in the period from 1950 to 1960 and 104% from I960 to 
2 
1970 (35)-^ The percentage increase from 1970 to 1976 was 72.6% (45). 
Trends in city expenditure for selected functions are illustrated in Fig­
ure 1.1. 
The increase in expenditures of municipal governments is coupled with 
lagging revenue from taxes. Historically, the traditional tax base of 
cities has failed to keep up with the new demands and ever increasing costs 
of old demands for public services. It may also be noted that the revenue 
elasticity with respect to income of their tax sources is relatively low. 
Most estimates of the figure range from .8 to 1.3 (19). The change in 
revenue for city governments between 1955 and 1976 is given in Table 1.1. 
A large proportion of tax revenue for local governments comes from the 
general property tax. In 1955, 74% of the total urban tax revenue was 
derived from this source (39). This can be compared with 62% in 1976 (45). 
However, cities do rely also on nonproperty tax revenue sources such as 
retail sales and personal income taxes, alcoholic beverage taxes, and busi­
ness licenses. The percent of revenue derived from nonproperty taxes is 
presented in Table 1.2. 
Intergovernmental aid is also a source of revenue for local govern­
ments. Aid for municipalities comes from both the state and federal gov­
ernments. Such revenue is becoming increasingly important to city govern­
ments as can be seen in Table 1.3. Trends in city revenues are illustrated 
in Figure 1.2. 
As mentioned above, debt is interrelated with government spending and 
taxation. The fiscal plight of cities can be further examined by analyzing 
"All numbers in parentheses refer to references in the bibliography. 
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Figure 1.1. Trends in city general expenditure for selected major func­
tions: 1967-1976 
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Table 1.1. Revenues of city governments for 1955 and 1976^ 
1955 1976 
Percentage 
increase 
Total general revenues $7,823 $66,856 755 
A. Total own revenues 6,385 33,107 418 
Taxes 5,100 23,336 357 
Property tax 3,767 14,165 276 
Sales and gross receipts 728 5,109 601 
Licenses and other 606 4,063 570 
Current charges and miscellaneous 1,285 9,771 660 
B. Intergovernmental revenues 1,438 22,234 1,446 
From state governments only 1,236 13,772 1,014 
^Source; U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 1955 
and 1975-76, p. 4. 
Table 1.2. Nonproperty taxes as a percentage of total taxes, 1972 and 
1976* 
Tax 
Percent 
1972 1976 
General sales 11 13 
Selective sales 8 8 
Other taxes and license 17 17 
Total 36 38 
^Calculated from: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 
1971-72, p. 5, and 1975-76, p. 5. 
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Table 1.3. Increasing importance of intergovernmental revenues^ 
Year Percentage increase 
1972-1973 36.1 
1973-1974 13.1 
1974-1975 18.2 
1975-1976 11.0 
^Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 1972-
73, p. 2, 1973-74, p. 2, 1974-75, p. 1, and 1975-76, p. 1. 
their debt situation. Just as the expenditures of cities have increased 
through time, so has municipal debt as illustrated in Table 1.4. 
The interrelationships between local government debt, taxation, and 
spending are not as straightforward as it might appear at first. Debt 
creation on the local level is not usually just a passive result of spend­
ing decisions but the result of definite decision-making processes by local 
governments. 
Debt creation at the local government level has been receiving more 
attention from economists as municipal indebtedness has reached such a high 
level in recent years that it has become an important factor in the finan­
cial structure of the U.S. As is now recognized, the creation of new 
indebtedness and the stock of debt instruments perform important economic 
functions. Debt creation is the primary means by which surplus funds are 
channeled to deficit economic units. Debt allows deficit units to purchase 
goods and services while allowing surplus units to benefit from interest 
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Table 1.4. Percentage increase in gross long-term debt outstanding^ 
Year Percentage increase 
1972-1973 6.7 
1973-1974 9.2 
1974-1975 6.6 
1975-1976 5.5 
^Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 
1975-76, p. 6. 
payments. Debt instruments, therefore, serve as means of payment and 
sources of liquidity and capital mobility (27). 
The Situation 
Economists have only relatively recently began to intensively study the 
public sector on the local level as a set of decision-making units within 
the economy. This analysis of public decision-making focuses largely on 
the concept of the median voter since public choice theory indicates that 
median preferences dominate in some democratic settings. In a democracy, 
it is implicit that public policy is determined by elected officials who 
compete for voters' favor by attempting to ascertain and carry out their 
will. There is wide agreement that political decision-makers tend to adopt 
2 
the preferences of the median voter. As Buchanan states: 
. . . the critical position assumed by the median taxpayer-voter 
in most of the models of majority voting allows an important 
^For examples, see (5), (7), (8), (9), and (10). 
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step to be taken toward converting the analysis of individual 
choice behavior into one that retains relevance for group choice. 
If we can, in some fashion, locate the median voter, we are then 
able to predict the direction of the effect that the various 
institutions will exert on fiscal choice . . . (14, p. 159). 
This theory of public decision-making has in the past few years been 
applied to local governments, mostly in examining determinants of municipal 
3 
expenditures and tax revenues. The acknowledgment that debt in a metro­
politan area also involves a decision-making process has also been made in 
the literature. One study by Wagner develops a theory of optimality in 
local debt limitation. He states that; 
Each individual citizen will have some most preferred combination 
of loan finance and tax finance which will depend upon the pre­
vailing tax institutions, rate of interest, length of loan and 
time preference. When collective decisions are made by majority 
vote, the collective borrowing choice will be effectively exer­
cised by the individual whose preferences are median for the 
group (Wagner, in Buchanan and Tollison (15, pp. 127-128)). 
In addition to its theoretical aspects, the situation also consists of 
the great aggregate of local government debt present today and its implica­
tions for the economy. If cities, like New York, get into excessive diffi­
culty, there is no guarantee that the federal government will step in to 
rescue them from default. If a city is forced to default, this could lead 
to a disruption of services to its citizens. But also important is the 
fact that default could have far-reaching effects on other cities because 
of the externalities involved. For example, in an imperfect-information 
capital market, a default may increase borrowing costs to other cities. 
Excessive borrowing on the part of some cities could also lead to more 
stringent state control over local debt levels. There is, in addition, the 
3 
For examples, see (6), (18), and (29). 
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possibility of excessive borrowing placing a burden on future taxpayers in 
that district and thereby deterring optimal location patterns. Although 
the shifting of national debt burdens to future generations depends on the 
definition of burden and the effect of government borrowing on private cap­
ital formation, there is little doubt that the burden of local debt is 
shifted forward to future residents, since borrowing is mostly from those 
outside the community. 
The Problem 
Local debt management is a long neglected area in economics. Most 
literature focuses on the national government and its debt management which 
differs greatly from local debt management. Complicating the situation is 
the presence of some literature on debt theory that leads to conclusions 
and policies that are wrong when applied to local finance. This is partic­
ularly true in analysis of the burden of debt and the question of the use 
of debt to finance capital expenditure to achieve intergenerational equity. 
An example of this problem is given by Brazer. He states "Whatever may be 
the impact of public debt issue in the national scene on saving and private 
investment, for example, it is clearly negligible with respect to any one 
local economy" (12, p. 3). 
On the local level there exists great externalities, both positive and 
negative, and the large number of jurisdictions prevent the concerted 
action possible on the national level. The fragmented nature of local gov­
ernments implies that much of the theory to be acceptable at the local 
level must be reevaluated. So the problem exists that with the present 
fiscal plight of cities and the great aggregate of indebtedness, little is 
10 
known about the local decision-making processes, debt management, and vari­
ations in the level of local debt. 
The Proposal 
This paper proposes to study the cross-sectional variation in the use 
of local government debt. The factors which determine the proportion of 
expenditures financed through debt will be sought. An analytical model to 
study variations in indebtedness on the local level will be derived. Then 
an empirical examination of the functional relationship between the post­
ponement incentives among different metropolitan areas and selected eco­
nomic, demographic, and sociological variables will be undertaken. The 
objective of this paper is to test hypotheses derived from theoretical 
models of the tax-versus-borrowing decisions of local governments. 
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CHAPTER II. CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL DEBT 
Types of Municipal Borrowing 
As was mentioned in the Introduction, much of the theory of debt 
focuses on the national level and is not directly applicable to the debt of 
local governments. It is therefore necessary, before constructing a model 
of intercity tax postponement differentials, to examine the characteristics 
of municipal debt and how the theory must be altered to fit the local situ­
ation. 
Municipal borrowing is divided into two general types. Short-term 
debts are usually made to anticipate the receipt of taxes since often tax 
yields and expenditures do not coincide. Short-term borrowing is also used 
to meet the cost of public improvements until long-term bonds, already 
approved, can be sold. Long-term borrowing is done through the sale of 
municipal bonds. These bonds are usually classified by the type of secu­
rity against which they are issued. A common classification is as follows: 
a) General obligation bonds that are full-credit bonds guaranteed by 
the taxing power of the municipality. 
b) Bonds guaranteed by mortgages on property. 
c) Revenue bonds that are nonguaraateed bonds backed by the revenue-
producing capacity of the improvements they finance. 
d) Special assessment bonds that are repaid by taxes collected on 
special property owners who benefit from the projects financed by 
the bonds. 
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Long-term debt is usually incurred for very specific purposes. It is 
primarily used for the acquisition or creation of physical assets such as 
land, structures, or equipment. 
Debt Limits 
Borrowing is not an inherent right for most municipalities except pos­
sibly the right to borrow in anticipation of taxes already levied. Debt in 
most states is regulated in much detail. The procedure by which municipal­
ities may create debt is given in provisions of the state charter. The 
purpose of these regulations is to prevent debt from being created contrary 
to the will of the people of the municipality and to limit the amount of 
debt that can be incurred. Various methods are used for deciding on bond 
issues. In some states, bond issues are voted on by citizens of the commu­
nity. In others, some bond issues are approved by the legislative body and 
others by the people. In still others, the legislative body issues all 
bonds. It is also common for states to require that when a bond issue is 
approved, a provision for an annual tax levy sufficient to pay the interest 
and amortization of the debt be passed at the same time. 
There are many restrictions on the amount of debt a municipality can 
incur. The most frequent limit is that debt must be less than a specified 
percentage of the municipalities assessed valuation. The specific percent­
age varies among different types of municipalities within a particular 
state and among different states (36). Although the state restrictions are 
numerous, many researchers have found that most municipal officials find 
other factors more limiting. Fisher and Fairbanks, for example, concluded 
that "... most local officials find market constraints and referendum 
13 
requirements a more effective curb on indebtedness than state debt limita­
tions" (23, p. 163). 
Scholarly support for debt limits is scarce. The state limits on 
municipal debt is attacked on both empirical and conceptual grounds. 
Empirical rejection is based on the observation that in spite of possible 
conceptual merits, these limits are fully circumvented in practice by 
municipalities. For example, municipal governments have substituted non-
guaranteed debt in the form of revenue bonds for full-credit debt. These 
revenue bonds are not subject to the debt limits or referendum since they 
do not pledge the taxing power of the municipality. Also since debt limits 
apply to each governmental unit, local governments can extend the limits by 
creating special districts such as school districts. In addition, when 
municipalities lease property under the provision that they will own the 
property at the end of the lease, this is not considered debt by the state 
and is another way around the limits. 
The concept of debt limits is also assailed on conceptual grounds. 
Most authors reach the conclusion that even if debt limits were effective 
4 in limiting municipal debt, they are not needed . They reason that as the 
municipalities become less prudent borrowers, the risk involved increases. 
Lenders will continue to lend only if they are compensated for this 
increased risk. Municipalities will borrow only as long as marginal bene­
fits of borrowing are greater than the marginal costs, and this process 
serves to limit municipal debt (15). 
4 
For examples, see (11), (25), and (26). 
14 
However, not all authors agree to the rejection of debt limits. 
Wagner contends that: 
The standard rejection of debt limitation is based upon a common 
methodological confusion about the appropriate specification of 
parameters and variables in economic analysis; it is illegitimate 
to base conclusions about the operation of a system of local gov­
ernments upon a model of the behavior of a single local govern­
ment when the model holds constant the behavior of all other 
localities (Wagner, in Buchanan and Tollison (15, p. 125)). 
As a result of his study which he feels corrects this problem, Wagner con­
cludes that the conceptual rationale holds for systems of localities as: 
The case for imposing statutory limitations upon the debt creat­
ing freedom of local government rests, therefore, on the virtual 
certainty that such units will, in the absence of limits, issue 
amounts of debt in excess of socially optimum limits (Wagner, in 
Buchanan and Tollison (15, p. 133)). 
External Borrowing 
Most debt issued by local governments is external debt, that is, debt 
held primarily by individuals, banks, and other financial institutions 
which are not located within the boundaries of the issuing entities. The 
prevailing professional opinion implies that local external debt issuance 
can shift the burden of current government expenditures from current to 
future residents. Indeed according to some authors, the fact that local 
government debt is external makes the issuance of such debt an appropriate 
technique for financing local capital improvements.^ By doing this, it is 
argued the burden may be spread over the life of the improvement and, 
therefore, among the frequently changing citizenry. Then people can be 
taxed more in accordance with the benefits they presumably receive than 
^For examples, see (24) and (33). 
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would be possible under simple tax finance (33). As Musgrave states: 
All this is of particular importance for borrowing by local gov­
ernments because such borrowing is largely in the nature of 
external borrowing. Pay as you use finance may now be supple­
mented by external borrowing, as durable facilities may be pro­
vided for without a reduction in other types of domestic capital 
foirmation. We have, in this case, a perfect analogy between the 
individual consumer who increases the volume of immediately 
available resources through the use of installment credit and the 
group that borrows from abroad to provide for capital investment 
in durable goods. Similarly, intergeneration equity in the pro­
vision of durable goods may be implemented by initial finance 
through external borrowing and by amortization of the debt in 
line with the accreation of borrowing to subsequent generations 
(33, p. 575). 
In summary, the Musgrave argument is that because local borrowing is 
external borrowing, it can shift the cost of current projects to future 
generations. He defines burden as the restriction in consumption possibil­
ities implicit in tax payments. Under these circumstances, debt issuance 
is clearly a technique by which current generations can defer such payments 
to future generations. The standard argument applies, of course, where the 
alternative to debt is current financing with nonproperty tax receipts 
(33). 
Vickery concludes, however, that the liability for future taxes does 
not actually represent a burden if it has been assumed that the tax is on 
property and if the property is sold through free market sale. If this is 
the case, the burden which he defines as a decrease in income or net worth 
must remain with the current generation as the future tax liability is 
capitalized in a rational market. That is, the present value of the future 
tax payments associated with the property will be paid implicitly by a 
decrease in the value of the property. He concludes that the burden, 
therefore, cannot be shifted by local debt finance but rather it is 
16 
transformed from explicit tax payments to a decrease in value of an asset. 
The burden stays with the current generation whether improvements are 
financed by taxes or debt issuance (56). 
Daly, as a result of his research, reaches the conclusion that the 
issuance of debt by municipalities leads to a temporal redistribution of 
payments not to a change in burden. He states that the results of his 
study do not imply 
. . . that the members of these communities should be indiffer­
ent between these alternative financing schemes. Indeed, given 
the realities of capital market conditions in the United States 
it is apparent that strong and different preferences should exist 
among citizens on the grounds of intra, if not inter-generational 
equity (17, p. 51). 
Therefore, debt financing does alter the time of explicit tax pay­
ments. In a perfect capital market, this alteration has little effect on 
the individual since by borrowing or saving he can rearrange payments to 
fit his preferences. But in an imperfect capital market, the ability to 
borrow is only available to people with a large amount of nonhuman wealth. 
In this situation, debt finance by local governments is the least expensive 
means most people have to defer tax payments since their main access to 
capital markets is the collective issuance of community debt. Therefore, 
debt finance by local governments allows the poor to borrow at a lower 
interest rate (17). 
Clearly, it can't be said that the debt of local governments can't be 
shifted to the future. It depends on the extent to which future taxes are 
foreseen in the market and the tax base and structure assumed. 
17 
Local Versus National Borrowing 
The borrowing of local units differs sharply from federal borrowing in 
many other ways also. As Buchanan and Wagner state; 
The important distinction between national, state and local gov­
ernment debt lies not in their relative size or rates of growth 
but in the unique possession of the money creation powers held by 
the national government. State and local debt plays no role in 
the money creation process. The debt of state and local govern­
ments is entirely real. No disguised money creation exists 
within their debt instruments (16, p. 21). 
This lack of monetary controls implies that state and local governments 
enter the market for long-term funds in a position more similar to private 
borrowers than the national government. 
On the national level, public debt has an impact on saving and private 
investment. However, for any one local economy, the effect on private sav­
ing and investment is clearly negligible (12). 
On the local level, borrowing is undertaken for designated purposes. 
There exists very definite relationships between most local debt and capi­
tal assets. This clearly differs from national debt creation (32). 
One important characteristic of local debt is that the interest on 
local government bonds is exempt from the federal income tax. These tax 
exempt bonds sell at a lower yield than taxable bonds of a similar quality 
and maturity. The yield differential depends primarily on the relative 
expected supply of the two kinds of bonds and upon the anticipated amount 
of taxes that can be avoided. When income is taxed progressively, the 
value of the exemption becomes worth more to buyers according to the size 
of their taxable income. 
18 
Lastly, municipalities have no immunity from the results of excessive 
borrowing. Nations, unlike municipalities, do not go bankrupt. They can 
repudiate their debts or use money inflation to rescue themselves (36). 
19 
CHAPTER III. THE MODEL 
Theoretical Basis 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to explain the variance in the 
proportion of local government spending which is financed by debt. The 
theoretical basis will be presented next. 
A paper by Adams on the determinants of individual preferences regard­
ing tax-postponement through government borrowing argues that there is rea­
son for low-income persons to prefer government borrowing while high-income 
persons have reason to oppose it. Adams' theory starts with several sim­
plifying assumptions that are listed below (1). 
1. There is no mobility of individuals between units of government. 
2. All individuals expect their future income to equal current 
income. 
3. The government has two alternative ways to finance a predetermined 
amount of expenditures. 
a) Collect enough taxes in year one to cover the entire cost or 
b) Borrow the amount needed in the first year and then collect 
enough taxes the second year to repay this amount plus inter­
est. 
4. Tax shares are based on income. 
5. Individuals reach their preferences without regard to the possible 
effect of their decision on the interest rate at which government 
can borrow. 
Given these assumptions, individuals have two alternative tax liabili­
ties. They may prefer a tax liability of X dollars in year one if 
20 
government collects taxes equal to planned spending or a tax liability of 
X(1 + r^) dollars of taxes in year two if the government relies on borrow­
ing, where r^ is the municipal bond rate. 
Next Adams gives seven assumptions about interest rates and income tax 
treatment of personal interest receipts and payments. These assumptions 
closely approximate observable conditions in the U.S. These assumptions 
imply that the net-of-tax return on individual lending is a function of 
individual income levels and net-of-tax cost of individual borrowing 
decreases as individual taxable income increases. 
Using the above assumptions, he derives a distribution of preferences 
between current taxation and borrowing for state and local governments. 
These preferences are shown to be closely related to income. The income 
tax rate separating income groups with different preferences is shown to 
depend on the interest rate structure existing at a point in time. 
Individual income and consumption possibilities are illustrated for 
the two years in Figure 3.1. The individual then is faced with the choice 
of point T or point B. Point T represents the situation where the govern­
ment taxes in year one are equal to the government expenditures. The indi­
vidual's share of the tax liability is X. Point B represents the situation 
if the government borrows. In this case, the individual's future tax share 
will be X(1 + r ). 
s 
The individual then considers the consumption opportunity sets result­
ing from each of the two policies. He would prefer the alternative that 
allows him to reach the highest indifference curve. 
Two vectors emanating from each point bound the consumption opportu­
nity sets. One vector describes personal lending and the other personal 
21 
Figure 3.1. Opportunity loci for individuals with marginal federal income 
tax rate of zero 
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borrowing. The vector representing lending is drawn upward and to the left 
from each point. The slope of this vector is one plus the net-of-tax 
return to lending. For all individuals, except those individuals with very 
high incomes, the absolute value of this slope is 1 + r^(l - t) where r^ is 
the federal bond rate and t is the marginal income tax rate. For very high 
income individuals, the slope of the lending vector is 1 + r^ because the 
highest after tax investment return from them is from tax-exempt municipal 
bonds. Personal borrowing vectors are drawn downward and to the right from 
each point. These vectors have slopes of 1 + r (1 - t) where r is the 
P P 
interest rate for personal borrowing. The slopes of the lending and bor­
rowing vectors will differ among individuals with different incomes and tax 
rates because most interest receipts are subject to the progressive income 
tax and personal interest payments are deductible. It is also assumed that 
r^ is greater than r^. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the case of an individual whose income is so 
low his marginal federal income tax rate is zero. The slope of his lending 
and borrowing vectors is (1 + r^) and (1 + r^), respectively. Adams con­
cludes that these individuals will prefer borrowing to taxation because the 
consumption opportunity locus from borrowing is to the right of the locus 
from current taxes. 
As taxable income increases, there is a counterclockwise rotation of 
the consumption opportunity loci around both points because through the 
income tax, the government receives part of the return from lending and 
pays part of the cost of personal borrowing when interest payments are 
itemized as deductions. The extent to which the government shares these 
benefits and costs differ between individuals with different incomes. The 
23 
point B will be preferred by individuals with incomes where their marginal 
federal income tax rate is less than or equal to 1 - ^ s/r^, where 1 - ^s/r^ 
is the tax rate at which the after tax return on federal securities is 
equal to the rate on municipal tax-exempt securities. Figure 3.2 shows 
the consumption opportunities locus for these individuals. 
The lending vector stops rotating at the income level for which 
t = 1 - ^s/r^. The slope of this vector is never less than 1 + r^ since 
the highest after tax return available for high-income individuals is on 
tax-exempt municipal securities. However, the personal borrowing vector 
will continue to decrease in slope as income increases since personal 
interest payments are deductible. Government borrowing will be preferred 
until the income level corresponds to t = 1 - ^ s/r^. At that income level, 
the individual will be indifferent between government borrowing and current 
taxation. 
The locus for high-income individuals is given in Figure 3.3. They 
prefer taxation since income is so high; the marginal tax rate is greater 
than 1 - ^ s/r^. Adams concludes that persons with income tax rates less 
than 1 - ^ s/r^ prefer local government borrowing to current taxation, and 
those individuals with tax rates greater than this prefer current taxation. 
Adams* theory implies that the indebtedness of communities depends on 
their income group composition and the distribution of political influence 
across the local income distribution. A municipality would tend to rely on 
borrowing the greater the proportion and/or the power of low-income people 
in the co iimunity. If the assumption is made that local governments are 
pure democracies in which the median voters dominate, the cities whose 
median voters preferred postponement of taxes would be more in debt than 
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Figure 3.2. Opportunity loci for individuals with marginal federal income 
tax rate less than or equal to 1 - ^s/r^ 
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Figure 3.3. Opportunity loci for individuals with marginal federal income 
tax rate greater than 1 - ^s/r 
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wealthier municipalities where the median voters preferred current taxa­
tion. 
Adams' paper notes that for a given income distribution and tax rate 
structure, the proportion of a community that will prefer borrowing depends 
on the relative value of the interest rates. The income level dividing the 
groups with different preferences depends on the corresponding marginal 
federal income tax rates, t = 1 - ^ s/r^ for local government. For example, 
if r = .10 and r = .07, with an income tax rate structure for a family of 
P s 
four filing a joint return with $3,000 of itemized deductions on 1969 
income, the dividing income level would be $25,850. 
Since the value of r relative to r determines the income tax rate 
s p 
separating those opposing and favoring municipal borrowing, changes in r^ 
relative to the other interest rates will change the proportion of the 
income distribution for and against municipal borrowing. If, for example, 
r^ falls, the separating income should increase and, therefore, increase 
the number of individuals preferring borrowing. This is plausible since 
one would expect the preference for borrowing to be inversely related to 
the cost of borrowing. 
Adams also considered the possibility that wealth might affect post­
ponement incentives. He found no reason for wealth to affect preferences 
for municipal borrowing, except via its effect on income (1). 
Another factor in explaining the variance in tax postponement could be 
the mobility of citizens of the municipalities. Individuals have the free­
dom of migration among cities, and a positive probability of out-migration 
would seem to imply a lowering of the marginal cost of borrowing to an 
individual as shown below. 
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If X represents the probability of staying in a given city over the 
years i through j, a value of X less than one implies that a median prefer­
ence voter will choose an excessive amount of debt for the city. In the 
extreme case where X = 0, the voter will prefer to finance all of the pub­
lic expenditure in year i by debt issue regardless of the interest rate 
since he will escape future taxation. Therefore, if X<1, the median voter 
will favor debt finance on the basis of an expected private cost less than 
the social cost and an excessive amount of local debt will be chosen. 
If T is the present value of future tax payments, T would equal: 
n 
T t.(l + r) ^  (3.1) 
i=l 
where n = length of amortization period 
r = rate of interest 
i = year of loan 
t^ = expected amount of tax for the individual 
With migration, the present discounted expected value of the individ­
ual's future tax payment associated with local debt finance is: 
n 
=y \t^(l + (3.2) 
i=l 
Therefore, the greater the probability of migration (the smaller is 
X), the smaller the present value of the tax share and the more debt is 
preferred (15). 
The effect of out-migration could also be included in Adams' analysis. 
This effect would shift point B upward as the probability of being present 
for future taxes decreases. 
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Another aspect of mobility may affect preferences for government bor­
rowing versus current taxation. It is possible that citizens who expect 
their community to grow in numbers might be more inclined to borrow because 
their share of debt service would be less than their share of current taxa­
tion. 
Expectations regarding future income of individuals also may affect 
the proportion of expenditure financed through debt. Those who expect to 
move upward in the income distribution might prefer that the government tax 
currently because their share will be less on the basis of their current 
income than it will be in the future if their expectations are realized. 
On the other hand, if someone expects his income to fall in the future, he 
may prefer borrowing because his future tax share will be less. These 
hypotheses are based on the assumption that taxes are based on income (1). 
Buchanan argues that some individuals will favor borrowing to finance 
capital expenditures which generate a flow of benefits over time. They 
will tend to favor borrowing because using current taxation for such capi­
tal expenditure may result in some individuals being biased against them 
because they fail to fully capitalize the value of future benefits. This 
may result because the current tax costs to them exceed the improperly com­
puted present value of benefits. If capital expenditures are financed only 
by current taxation, the failure to take into account all future benefits 
may result in inefficiently small expenditures on capital projects. If, 
however, the capital expenditures are financed by borrowing, it is possible 
that future tax liabilities from borrowing may not be fully capitalized 
either. These two effects may to some extent cancel each other, leaving 
the municipality less biased in its decisions than it would be if taxes 
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were used to finance capital expenditure. Therefore, Buchanan concludes 
that some individuals will prefer that borrowing be used for capital proj­
ects because they do not want the community to be biased against them (14). 
Furthermore, one might expect borrowing to be preferred for capital 
projects because people who might think that borrowing for current operat­
ing budgets is imprudent might not object to borrowing for capital projects 
because it involves pay-as-you-use financing. Also, it is analogous to the 
usual advice for prudent personal finance. For example, it is prudent to 
borrow to purchase a house but not to borrow for recurrent expenditures. 
Other Factors 
Five other factors will be examined in the regression analysis in 
Chapter IV. Although these factors do not have strong theoretical bases as 
incentives for tax postponement, they have been found to have influence on 
several other aspects of municipal finance.^ It is therefore possible that 
they might also influence the postponement of tax liability. One of these 
factors is the change in expenditures over time. Cities have to meet 
increases in expenditures from three basic sources, taxes, intergovernmen­
tal revenues, and borrowing. How much incentive a community has to finance 
this change in expenditure through borrowing may be influenced by the mag­
nitude of this change. This might be especially true since tax increases 
are often resisted and occur only with a lag after expenditures rise. 
Another factor included is the total population of the city. Buchanan 
argues that a sense of "community" serves as a constraint on inclinations 
^For examples, see (3), (4), (22), and (38). 
to better one's own position at the expense of others. If this argument is 
applied to incentives for tax postponement via government borrowing, it may 
be that a sense of "community" serves as a constraint on inclinations to 
take full advantage of the possibility of shifting the tax burden to 
others. If Buchanan's argument holds, ths sense of "community" may be a 
less operative restraint in large cities than in small ones (13). 
The third factor is the percent of revenue from property taxes. It is 
possible that if property taxes are already a high percentage of total 
revenue, individuals may prefer to postpone additional tax liability via 
government borrowing. This hypothesis is based on the nature of the prop­
erty tax. It is, first of all, a highly visible tax, and individuals are 
very much aware of it. It is also more painful to pay than the "pay-as-
you-go" income and sales taxes. Property taxes must usually be paid in 
lump sums. These characteristics make the tax liability very apparent to 
individuals (34). 
The next two factors are introduced as proxy measures of the distribu­
tion of general revenues from alternative sources. These factors are 
intergovernment revenues as a percent of total revenue and the percent of 
total revenue from taxes. The revenue structure was found relevant in sev­
eral other studies of municipal finance, and it is possible that this fac­
tor affects incentives for tax postponement. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Dependent Variable 
The statistical method used was ordinary least squares regression. 
^72 ~ ^ 67 The dependent variable, denoted by AD, is -pr —=—r r where 
67 72 ^ 
D^2 is the level of debt in 1972 
D is the level of debt in 1967 
o / 
E^2 is the level of expenditure in 1972 
E^ is the level of expenditure in 1967 
d/ 
This variable, AD, is used to represent tax postponement via govern­
ment borrowing by municipalities. It measures the percentage of expendi­
tures for which payment is postponed through debt. Expenditures of munici­
palities are financed by three basic means, taxes, borrowing, or intergov­
ernmental revenue. Therefore, the change in debt from 1967 to 1972 divided 
by the sum of expenditures from 1967 through 1972 measures the proportion 
of expenditure for which taxes were postponed via borrowing. The detailed 
data needed for this research were available only for five-year intervals. 
Therefore, the flow of borrowing had to be measured by the net change in 
the stock of debt. Since five-year data were used, it was necessary to 
multiply the expenditure terms in the denominator by 2.5 to obtain an esti­
mate of expenditure for the five-year period. 
The Data 
The major sources of data used were The County and City Data Book for 
1967 and 1972. These books were published by the Bureau of the Census. 
Unfortunately, the 1972 data book was the latest source of data available 
when this research began, so the time period used was the most recent 
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possible. The problem of finding current data is present for most empiri­
cal studies of municipal finance. Fisher and Fairbanks addressed this 
problem in their book by stating that "Although the time required to col­
lect, compile, and analyze data from hundreds of units of local government 
means that the statistics in a study of local governments are apt to be 
several years old, the general pattern changes slowly" (23, p. 230). 
The data for total general expenditures, E and E _ above, include O / i 2-
all city expenditures except those for utilities, liquor stores, and 
employee retirement. Debt outstanding, D^_ and D__, is defined as all debt 
d / /z 
obligations remaining unpaid at the close of the city's fiscal year (47). 
The data for all but one of the independent variables also came from 
these sources. The data were for incorporated cities with populations 
greater than or equal to 25,000. Only those cities with data available in 
both the 1967 and 1972 data books were used in this analysis. The indepen­
dent variables are listed in Table 4.1. 
Most of the variables do not need further clarification, how­
ever, three need to be defined in more detail. The percent of families 
residing in the same house for five years, includes all persons five 
years or older who did not move during the five-year interval as well as 
those who had moved but by 1970 had returned to their 1965 residence. 
Residence in 1965 was used in conjunction with residence in 1970 to deter­
mine the extent of the residential mobility of the population. The percent 
change in year-round units, is defined as including vacant units 
intended for year-round use. 
The income levels used for variables Y, , , are cal­low 125 low/pop 
culated according to the definition of the low-income level originated by 
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Table 4.1. Variable definitions 
Name Description 
YQ  2 Percent of families having income less than $3,000 
^ Percent of families having income between $3,000 and $4,999 
Y^ ^ Percent of families having income between $5,000 and $6,999 
Y^ Percent of families having income between $7,000 and $9,999 
YJ Q^  Percent of families having income between $10,000 and $14,999 
Yj^_25 Percent of families having income between $15,000 and $24,999 
Y„c Percent of families having income greater than or equal to 
$25,000 
Y , Median income 
med 
Y Per capita income 
cap 
Y, Percent of families below the low income level low 
Yj^25 Number of persons with less than 125% of the low income level 
divided by total population 
Y- / Number of persons with income below the low income level 
ow pop divided by total population 
Y^ Percent of families with incomes less than $4,999 
Yy Percent of families with incomes less than $6,999 
Y^Q Percent of families with incomes less than $9,999 
Yj^^ Percent of families with incomes less than $14,999 
AI 8  Percent of population between 18 and 65 years of age 
Percent of population less than 5 years of age 
A.g Percent of population more than 65 years of age 65 
A , Median age 
med ® 
Agg Percent enrolled in high school 
M^ Percent residing in same house for 5 years 
M Percent enrolled in college 
c 
Percent change in year-round units 
yr 
^60-70 Percent population change 1960-1970 
M, p Percent of households who moved into housing unit between 1965 
*5-70 and 1970 
W , Median value of owner-occupied housing 
med 
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Table 4.1. (continued) 
Name Description 
Percent of revenue from property tax 
Percent of intergovernmental revenue 
Interest rate, 1967 
Percent of total revenue from taxes 
Percent change in expenditures from 1967 to 1972 
Total population 
Capital expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure, 1972 
the Social Security Administration in 1964 and subsequently modified by the 
Federal Interagency Committee in 1969. At the core of this definition is a 
nutritionally adequate food plan designed by the Department of Agriculture. 
This index provides a range of income cutoffs or "low-income thresholds" 
adjusted by such factors as family size, sex and age of the family head, 
number of children less than 18 years of age, and farm-nonfarm residence. 
In 1969 low-income levels ranged from $1,487 for a female unrelated 
individual over 65 living on a farm to $6,116 for a nonfarm family with a 
male head and with 7 or more persons. The average low-income level for a 
nonfarm family of four was $3,745 (47). 
Ten independent variables were not taken directly from the data books 
but were computed using data from these sources. These variables are 
explained in Table 4.2. 
Only one variable, i, was taken from a data source other than the 
County-City Data Books. The source for this independent variable was 
Moody's Miinicipal Government ^ nual, 1968. The municipal bond rating was 
kpt 
I 
*t 
E 67-72 
K, 72 
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Table 4.2. Variable calculations 
Variable 
name Computation 
K72 
Total expenditure, 1972 - Total expenditure excluding 
capital outlays, 1972 
Total expenditures, 1972 
*18-65 Percent of individuals 18 years and older - Percent of 
uals 65 years and older 
individ-
4lS 
Number of persons enrolled in high school 
Total population 
"c 
Number of persons enrolled in college 
Total population 
^125 
Number of persons with income less than 125% of low-income level 
Total population 
^low/pop 
Number of persons with income less than the low-income level 
Total population 
^5 ""O-S + ?3-5 
^7 ?0_3 + ?3-5 + ?5-7 
?10 ^0-3 ^3-5 ^5-7 ^7-10 
?15 ^0-3 ^3-5 ^5-7 ^7-10 ^10-15 
used as a proxy for the interest rate. The relationship between published 
credit ratings and municipal borrowing costs has received a good deal of 
attention in recent years.^ There is an inverse relationship between pub­
lished credit ratings and municipal borrowing costs. This is due in part 
^For examples, see (2), (27), and (28). 
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to the fact that the average yield on Aaa rated bonds is less than the 
yield on Aa's which in turn is less than the yield on A rated general obli­
gation bonds and etc. (37). 
As is well-recognized, many problems are present with data on munici­
pal finances. For example, as mentioned before, the limits on debt vary 
from state to state and even within states. This is a crucial question in 
analyzing municipal borrowing. This problem is dealt with in this paper by 
the use of state dummy variables to test for possible differences among 
states due to different limitations. 
Public financial data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau are reported 
so that a discrepancy between the amount of debt within city areas and the 
amount of debt of city governments per se exists in all cases. To compli­
cate the situation, this discrepancy varies erratically from city to city. 
This aspect of city financial statistics results from variations in the 
extent to which functional responsibilities are divided between municipal 
and other governmental units, differences in accounting procedures, and 
general inaccuracies in reporting financial data. 
One of the most important of these inaccuracies often occurs in data 
on the long-term debt of cities. The U.S. Census Bureau includes in its 
figures all debt whether it represents a general obligation of the city, a 
revenue bond, or a debt that is merely administered by the city. An exam­
ple of how this distorts the data on the level of municipal debt is illus­
trated by a method of constructing schools. It sometimes involves the 
issuance of a lease-rental type bond where the city promises to service the 
debt from revenue derived from renting the project to the school district. 
So to report the revenue bond as a part of the city's indebtedness may 
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produce misleading conclusions about the city's fiscal profile (3). This 
2 factor may be expected to reduce the R but will not necessarily bias the 
coefficients of the included variables. This problem could not be cor­
rected for without giving up the large sample size provided by the computer 
tapes with the flawed data. 
The Results 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the variance in the proportion 
of local government spending which is financed by debt and test theories of 
this choice. As the theoretical basis presented in Chapter III indicated, 
there are hypotheses in the literature that tax-postponement through gov­
ernment borrowing is influenced by the following factors: income (Y), Age 
(A), mobility (M), interest rate (i), and capital expenditures (k). 
One regression was run with variables chosen to measure the effect of 
these factors on the dependent variable. This regression also tested 
Adams' contention that there is no reason to expect wealth to affect post­
ponement incentives. In addition, intergovernmental revenue was included 
to test for the effect, if any, of the revenue structure on postponement 
incentives. The variables used are listed in Table 4.3 with their hypoth­
esized signs. 
The following section of this paper explains the basis for the hypoth­
esized signs presented in Table 4.3. The income variables are related to 
Adams' paper which was summarized in Chapter III. His hypothesis implies 
that the indebtedness of communities depends on their income group composi­
tion and the distribution of political influence across the local income 
distribution. Adams concludes that low- and middle-income groups will 
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Table 4.3. Variables and hypothesized signs for regression 
Variables Hypothesized sign 
For income: 
^0-3 
"3-5 + 
?5-7 
^7-10 + 
^10-15 •*" 
^15-25 "*• 
^25 
Y , 
med 
Y 
cap 
^low 
^125 
^low/pop ^ 
For age: 
S 
\.ed 
*18-65 
*HS 
For mobility: 
^60-70 
«5 
M + 
c 
M + 
yr 
^65-70 
For interest rate: 
i 
For capital expenditure: 
^72 
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Table 4.3. (continued) 
Variables Hypothesized sign 
For wealth: 
W , -
med 
For intergovernmental revenue: 
I 
prefer borrowing while high-income individuals will prefer current taxa­
tion. As he points out, the income tax rate separating income groups with 
different preferences depends on the interest rate structure existing at a 
point in time (1). 
For the signs of the income variables to be consistent with Adams' 
theory, those income levels below the cutoff income should have positive 
signs, and those income levels above it should have negative signs. Since 
the cutoff income level for individuals to prefer taxation was shown in 
Chapter III to be greater than $25,000, income variable should have a 
negative sign. Income variables Y^ ^ , Y^ ^ , Y^ and 
Y^g_25 would be expected to have positive signs by this reasoning. 
Likewise, low-income variables, Y. , Y and Y, , would be low 125 low-pop 
predicted to have positive coefficients. The variables Y^^^ and Y^^^ are 
hypothesized to have negative signs, for the higher the value of these 
variables, the less tax postponement is expected. 
The variable Y^^^ is of major significance in Adams' paper and in the 
public choice literature in general. Median income may be used instead of 
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a more complete description of the income distribution because of the cru­
cial role played by the median voter in some voting models. 
The second factor that is hypothesized to affect tax-postponement is 
the age distribution of the city's population. The age variable, A^, is 
predicted to have a positive regression coefficient because the larger the 
percent of a city's population that is under five years of age, the greater 
would be the need for future school facilities which are financed largely 
by debt. A positive sign is also expected for the variable A^^. This is 
primarily because persons 65 years and older see their tax liability as 
decreasing in the future since the income of this age group tends to be 
less than it was in their productive years. This is, of course, only true 
if taxes are based on or related to income. Therefore, these people would 
be expected to prefer tax postponement. Furthermore, for this age group, 
tax postponement is more likely to become tax avoidance than for younger 
citizens since their life expectancy is shorter. This is analogous to 
expected migration in general. 
The variables and are predicted to have negative coeffi­
cients because incomes of these groups are expected to increase in the 
future and, therefore, their tax-liability would be expected to increase 
also. A lower cutoff age would have been preferred for the variable 
since that age grouping includes some individuals, for example, those 55 to 
65 years of age, who may expect income to fall in the near future. The 
data, however, did not allow the deletion of the older part of this group. 
Median age, is expected to have a positive sign. The higher the 
median age of a municipality, the more the citizens should prefer govern­
ment borrowing as they see their tax-liability as falling in the future. 
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Expectations regarding mobility are also hypothesized to influence 
tax-postponement via government borrowing. The theory presented in Chap­
ter III concludes that the more mobile a community is, the more that com­
munity would be expected to rely on debt finance. This results from the 
fact that individuals who anticipate moving from a community in the future 
would prefer to lessen their tax lability now since they won't have to bear 
the burden of debt service in the future. Mobility variables M , 60-70 yr 
and are hypothesized to have positive signs because if individuals 
in the community expect population to continue to grow, they expect their 
share of debt service to decline. The sign of variable would be pre­
dicted to be negative as it is the percent of people who resided in the 
same house for five years and represents a fairly stable sector of the com­
munity. Variable would be predicted to have a positive sign because a 
large percentage of college students do not remain in the same city where 
they attended college. 
The rate of interest is also expected to influence the postponement 
incentives of individuals in municipalities. This variable is hypothesized 
to have a negative coefficient. As Adams* paper illustrates, the income 
tax rate that divides those opposing tax postponement from those favoring 
it is determined by the value of the municipal bond rate relative to the 
interest rate for personal borrowing. Therefore, differences in the munic­
ipal bond rate between communities change the proportions of income groups 
in favor of and opposing debt financing. In municipalities with lower 
interest rates, the income level separating the groups will be higher, and 
more people will favor borrowing. 
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Capital expenditures, the variable is expected to have a positive 
sign. Since most capital expenditures produce a flow of benefits over a 
number of years, some individuals would prefer government borrowing to 
finance these expenditures. As was pointed out in Chapter III, Buchanan 
argues that there are two "illusions" involved in the use of government 
borrowing to finance capital expenditures. If the "asset illusion" and 
"debt illusion" to some extent cancel each other out, Buchanan feels that 
the use of borrowing may be preferred because it involves less net illu­
sion. 
Wealth is another factor discussed in Chapter III. Adams concludes 
that there is no reason to expect wealth to influence postponement incen­
tives at the state and local levels of government except through its effect 
on income. The regression coefficient of the wealth variable, is 
hypothesized to have a negative coefficient to be consistent with the rea­
soning relating to income, but this variable is not predicted to be signif­
icant. 
The last of the factors tested in this regression is intergovernmental 
revenue. Since the concern here is with the proportion of locally financed 
expenditure which is postponed through borrowing, the expected effect of 
grants depends crucially on whether grant money is included in the expendi­
ture levels used in the denominator of the dependent variable. Since such 
grant money is included, the grants would lower the percent of expenditures 
borrowed, even if the ratio of debt to local taxes was unchanged. 
The variable used in this study is intergovernmental revenue as a per­
cent of total revenue. This formulation follows the procedure used in 
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previous studies of municipal finance. This formulation makes it possible 
to abstract from the effects of the absolute size of intergovernmental 
revenue on the dependent variable and hopefully avoid circularity problems 
at least to some extent. Because of the element of circularity, however, 
this variable is used only as a supplement to the basic statistical analy­
sis. 
The results of the regression with 26 variables are given in Table 
2 4.4. The R measures the percentage of the variation in the dependent 
variable that is explained by variations in the independent variables. If 
it is concluded on theoretical grounds that the independent variable should 
positively influence the dependent variable, a one-tail test of the null 
hypothesis, = 0, can be used to determine if this relationship is 
statistically confirmed. If the sign of the coefficient is as predicted, 
this implies that the statistical evidence is consistent with prior belief. 
Then the significance of the variable can be determined through an F-test. 
The hypotheses to be tested were given above in Table 4.3. Variables 
^60-70' S' •^65' \ed' ^65-70' ^ 15-25' ^ 10-15' ^ 0-3' ^ 3-5' ^ 5-7, ^ low' 
^125' ^ low/pop' ^ 7-10' ^ yr' ^72 predicted to be directly related to 
the dependent variable, and variables M^, A^g, Y^^^, I, i, 
and are expected to vary inversely with AD. 
Variables ^5-7' ^ 7-10' ^ 10-15' ^ 15-25' ^ cap' ^ low' 
Yj^25' and had signs inconsistent with the theory, but the F-values 
for these variables were all insignificant. The other 15 variables had the 
hypothesized signs. Three of these variables were significant. The 
g 
For examples, see (3), (4), and (38). 
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Table 4.4. Regression with 26 variables 
Variable Coefficient F-statistic 
^0-3 -.00454 .003 
?3-5 -.02598 .096 
?5-7 -.02806 .114 
^7-10 -.02435 .086 
^10-15 -.02762 .111 
^15-25 -.02036 .060 
^25 -.02065 .061 
\ed -.00006 5.057* 
Y 
cap .00007 2.665 
^low -.00217 .030 
?125 -6.86446 3.123 
^low/pop .21091 .072 
W , 
med -.04199 .173 
i -.00004 .000 
^60-70 .00002 .042 
S —.00460 1.533 
M 
c 
.18752 .351 
^65-70 -.00601 2.513 •L. 
M yr .00116 12.069 
^5 .01178 .598 
^18-65 -.00744 1.343 
^65 -.01393 2.577 
^S -2.16216 2.323 
\ed .00288 .247 
I -.00014 .065 
to
 
.29031 47.396^ 
^Significant at .05. 
^Significant at .01. 
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variable Y , was significant at the .05 level while K_„ and M were sig-
med ° 72 yr 
nificanc at the .01 level. These results are summarized in Table 4.4. The 
was .21402. 
These results lend some support to Adams' theory of the influence of 
income on postponement incentives, Buchanan's hypothesis about preferences 
for the use of debt to finance capital expenditures, and the theory of the 
effect of mobility on preferences for government borrowing. With respect 
to income, the results were rather mixed. Only one of the income variables 
was significant. However, this variable, is very fundamental not 
only to the implications of Adams' theory, which are based on the concept 
of the median voter, but also to the framework of public choice theory 
which is dominated by the median voter. Adams also reasoned that wealth 
was expected to have no effect on preferences except through income. The 
variable W , had a negative but insignificant coefficient which supports 
his contention. The variable was the only proxy for capital expendi­
ture and had a large F-value. For mobility, once again only one of the 
variables, was significant. But in addition, four of the five mobil­
ity variables had the predicted sign giving some support to the mobility 
theory. 
Since municipalities have limits imposed by states on their debt crea­
tion and since these limits vary from state to state, state dummy variables 
were added to attempt to account for any independent state effects that may 
exist. The results of the regression with dummy variables are given below 
and summarized in Table 4.5. 
2 The R increased to .35270. Variables MgQ_^Q, A^, A^^^, M^, A^g, M^, 
Vs' ^^15-25' ^25' V' "mW *72' hs-65 e:<pected 
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Table 4.5. Regression with 26 variables and state dummy variables 
Variable Coefficient F-statistic 
Y g g  .0 2 9 1 6  . 1 2 3  
Y, , -.00679 .007 
Y_ _ -.00200 .001 J— / 
Y^ ^0 -.00191 .001 
ylo_i5 -.00759 .008 
Y^2_25 .00104 .000 
Y23 -.00596 .005 
Y , -.00004 2.039 
med 
Y .00008 3.447 
cap 
Y, -.00103 .006 low 
Y^25 -7.61780 3.328 
Y. , .35446 .189 low/pop 
W ^ -.03491 .077 
med 
i .01139 .284 
^60-70 .00001 .037 
-.00092 .055 
M .25582 .593 
c 
M,. -.00066 .028 
55-70 
M .00105 8.329 
yr 
.01409 .740 
ai8-65 -'00417 '389 
-.00715 .591 
-.10524 .005 
A , .00146 .057 
med 
I -.00017 .054 
Ky2 .30818 44.247* 
^Significant at .01. 
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signs. Variables Y^_^, Y^_^, "^io-15' \ap' ^125' \ow» 
^low/pop' ^ 65-70' ^ did not have the predicted signs. Variables 
and K^2 were significant at the .01 level reenforcing support for mobility 
and capital expenditures as factors affecting tax postponement incentives. 
9 In addition, the coefficients of 18 state variables were significant. 
In the above two regressions, multicollinearity among income variables 
was a major estimation problem. The presence of a close linear relation­
ship between the variables was indicated by the values in the correlation 
matrix. Therefore, 16 regressions were run with AD as the dependent vari­
able and each of the income variables as independent variables. These 
variables were Y^_^, Y^_ Q^, Y^^^, Y^^^, 
\ow' ^125' ^ low/pop' ^ 5' ^ 7' ^ 10' 'IS* results are summarized in 
Table 4.6. Only three of the variables, Y_ Y_ . and Y, ^ oo did not /—iv iU—ij 13—Zj 
have the hypothesized signs. 
Adams' theory contends that low- and middle-income groups would be 
predicted to prefer borrowing. This hypothesis is supported for the low-
income groups in these regressions. Variables Y^ _, Y Y , Y .r, and 
u—j V low iZj 
^low/pop addition to having the predicted signs have significant 
F-values. Variables Y^ ^ , Y^^^, Y^^^, and are significant at the 
.01 level while Y ^ is significant at the .05 level. Variable Y^ _ has 
u j—7 
the expected sign and is significant at the .10 level. 
The state variables with significant coefficients were Alabama, 
Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Minne­
sota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Vermont. The signs of the coefficients were all nega­
tive. 
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Table 4.6. Income regressions 
2 Variable Coefficient F-statistic R 
Y. , .00601 9.165^ .01390 0-3 b 
Yo c .00594 6.159° .00939 3-5 
Yc -, .00474 3.495 .00535 5-7 
Y 7-10 -.00081 .134 .00021 
Y -.00292 3.242 .00497 10-15 
^15-25 -.00202 2.533 .00389 
Y_c -.00251 1.913 .00294 25 
Y 
med -.00001 5.842^ .00892 
Y -.00003 7.030* .01072 
cap 
Y, low .00516 10.103* .01533 
Y 125 1.46473 7.902* .01203 
Y low/pop .44648 10.859* .01646 
^5 .00315 8.075* .01229 
^7 .00211 6.952* .01060 
?io .00141 4.392^ .00672 
^15 .00139 2.772 .00425 
^Significant at .01. 
^Significant at .05. 
For the income variables and ^15-25' regression 
coefficients are not as hypothesized. This does not necessarily detract 
from Adams* theory for his analysis indicates that the preference is not 
just for borrowing or for taxation but that the intensity of preference 
varies with income, among those having one preference. The fact that these 
variables were not significant is consistent with the prediction that 
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middle-income groups may be nearly indifferent, while intensity of prefer­
ences rises at both ends of the income distribution. 
The variable for high income, has a coefficient consistent with 
the theory but is not significant at the .05 or .01 level. The sign of the 
coefficient tends to substantiate Adams' theory. 
In the case of the variables representing median and per capita 
income, Y^^^ and Y^^^, respectively, they both have the predicted signs and 
are significant. These results once again coincide with the conclusions of 
Adams' theory. 
For the variables representing cumulative income classes, Y^, Y^, Y^^, 
and Y^^, the predicted signs would be positive since they represent low-
and middle-income classes. The regression coefficients were as predicted 
for all four variables, and Y^, Y^, and Y^^ were significant. These 
results seem, for the first two variables, Y^ and Y^, to confirm the 
results for variables Y„ Y and Y^ and lend support to the theory. 
The variable Y^^ representing all families with income less than $9,999 had 
a positive sign while the variable Y^ had a negative one. This once 
again might be explained by the intensity of preferences. When the income 
class Y^ is combined with the lower income groups whose preferences are 
expected to be more intense, the preference of the lower income groups dom­
inate. The same explanation applies to the variables Y^^ and 
conclusion, it appears that the results of these regressions strongly sup­
port Adams' proposition. 
Multicollinearity problems existed for other variables besides income 
in the first and second regressions. Several regressions were run to 
select variables to represent each of the five factors hypothesized to 
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affect tax postponement incentives: income, age, mobility, the interest 
rate, and capital expenditures. However, the variable for the interest 
rate was eliminated since it failed to be significant in any of the regres­
sions. Variable Y, was selected for income, A , and A,„ for age, low med 18-65 
for mobility, and for capital expenditures. 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, four new factors were 
introduced: the percent of total revenue from taxes, the change in expen­
ditures from 1967 to 1972, total population, and the percent of total 
revenue from the property tax. As stated in Chapter III, there is no 
theory relating these factors to tax postponement via debt, but other 
studies of municipal finance have found these factors do appear to have an 
effect. Therefore, these variables were included to see if they had any 
effect on tax-postponement incentives. 
As explained before, A should have a positive coefficient; K a 
med / / 
positive coefficient; ^ negative coefficient; a positive 
coefficient; and , a positive coefficient. The variable is included 
along with the variable I to more completely test the effect of the 
revenue structure on intercity differences in tax-postponement incentives. 
Unfortunately, the circularity problems that existed with the variable I are 
also present with respect to the variable R^. To some extent, measures 
the same thing as does the dependent variable. Once again the circularity 
problem is to some extent lessened by the formulation of the variable. In 
this case, the variable is formulated as the percent of total revenue from 
taxes. The variable R^, like the variable I, should have a negative sign. 
If R^ is high, this might reflect the past preferences of the citizens of 
the community for current taxes relative to tax postponement via borrowing. 
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The variable represents the change in expenditures between 1967 
and 1972. This variable would be predicted to have a positive coefficient. 
If expenditures increased by a relatively large amount during this inter­
val, citizens might prefer to meet this increase in expenditures more 
through government borrowing than through a rapid increase in their present 
tax liability. 
For P^, the total population, the expected sign is positive. This 
predicted sign is based on Buchanan's argument that the sense of "commu­
nity" may be a less operative restraint in large cities than in small ones. 
People in small cities may therefore be less inclined to shift burdens to 
others than individuals in larger cities. 
The variable the percent of revenue from property taxes, is pre­
dicted to have a positive sign. Given the nature of the property tax as 
discussed in Chapter III, it is possible that if the percent of revenue 
from property taxes is already high, individuals may prefer to postpone 
additional tax liability via government borrowing. 
The regression using these variables was summarized in Table 4.7. The 
2 R was .18350. All the variables except and had the predicted 
signs. Six of the ten variables were significant. Variables R^, snd 
were significant at the .01 level while variables Rp^> I, and were 
significant at the .05 level. 
Two of the four variables representing the new factors were signifi­
cant. These variables were and R^^. The variable I was also signifi­
cant. For the four categories for which theory was presented in Chapter 
III, capital expenditures, income, and mobility were significant. The age 
variables were not significant. 
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Table 4.7. Regression with 10 variables 
Variables Coefficient F-statistic 
E 67-72 
A , 
med 
sz 
rpt 
I 
^18-65 
low 
M yr 
-.14029 
.01485 
-.00277 
.28501 
.00019 
-.00137 
.00120 
.01365 
.00279 
.00103 
7.063' 
.075 
3.403 
53.624^ 
5.021^ 
4.999^ 
.515 
.066 
4.911^ 
18.422® 
Significant at .01. 
'significant at .05. 
This regression was also run with state dummy variables. These 
2 
results are presented in Table 4.8. The R increased to .32755. Once 
again two variables did not have the predicted signs. However, this time 
the variables were and P^. Variable also did not have the 
predicted sign in the previous regression. Variable is now negative 
instead of positive as before. This might be because by putting states in 
as variables some of the influence of city size is now accounted for by the 
state variables. 
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Table 4-8. Regression with 10 variables and state dunnny variables 
Variable Coefficient F-statistic 
E, 67-72 
A , 
med 
^72 
rpj 
I 
*18-65 
^low 
^yr 
-.24688 17.064 
.06461 .746 
.00033 .035 
.06675 40.626* 
.00014 1.314 
-.00122 2.396 
.00166 .927 
-.00984 .027 
.00171 .910 
.00133 23.631* 
^Significant at .01. 
Three variables were significant in this regression. They were 
K^2> and Myj.' All these variables were significant at the .01 level. 
Again, some of the state variables were significant.^^ 
The final set of regressions to be presented in this paper was run 
with the eight variables which were most significant in the previous 
regressions. As before, the regression was run first without state dummy 
variables and then with these variables added. The results of these two 
regressions are summarized in Table 4.9 and 4.10. 
The states with the significant regression coefficients were 
Alabama (-), Arkansas (-), California (-), Florida (-), Georgia (-), 
Idaho (-), Kansas (-), Louisiana (+), Maryland (-), Massachusetts (-) , 
Michigan (-), Minnesota (-), Mississippi (-), Montana (-), Nevada (-), New 
Jersey (-), North Dakota (-), Ohio (-), Oklahoma (-), Pennsylvania (-), 
Rhode Island (-), and Virginia (-). The signs of the coefficients are 
given in the parentheses. 
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Table 4.9. Regression with 8 variables 
Variable Coefficient F-statistic 
M .00116 24.317^ yr a 
-.14947 8.233 
^72 .28584 55.347^ b 
Rp^ .00018 4.337 
I -.00151 6.131^ 
Y, .01434 6.006^ low •k 
Y -.00001 4.464 
med 
^125 -4.76549 5.194® 
^Significant at .01. 
^Significant at .05. 
Table 4.10. Regression with 8 variables and state dummy variables 
Variable Coefficient F-statistic 
M .00126 22.251^ yr 
4: -.24233 16.563 
K72 .26975 42.543* 
KpT .00017 2.255 
I -.00125 2.526 
Y, .00735 1.424 low 
Y 
med -.00001 11.260^ 
-2.72633 1.383 125 
^Significant at .01. 
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2 For the regression without the dummy variables. The R was .18525. 
The eight variables used were R^, ^low' \ed' ?125' 
Of these variables, only one, did not have the predicted sign. 
Seven variables had the hypothesized signs and all seven were significant. 
Variables M , R,^, and K were significant at the .01 level while I, Y , yr 1 / z low 
^med' RpY ^'cre significant at the .05 level. 
2 With the dummy variables in the regression, the R increased to 
.32655. Again variable did not have the hypothesized sign. Of the 
seven variables with the predicted signs, four were significant at the .01 
level. They were M , R_, K__, and Y ,. Some of the states also had 
^ yr T 72' med 
regression coefficients that were significant.^^ 
In total, 34 variables were used in the regressions presented in this 
paper. Of these variables, 22 had signs consistent throughout the regres­
sions. The following variables consistently had the predicted signs: ^£5' 
\ed' ^5' ^ 10' ^15' "60-70' *5' "3' 'SiS' "c' "yr' "med' ^72' *1' 
hl-12' ®PT-
The variables that consistently did not have the hypothesized signs 
were ^^0-15' ^ 65' ^65-70' Possible explanations for these 
results will be discussed next. Possible explanations for the signs of 
Y_ and Y,„ were discussed earlier. It seemed possible that these /—iu lu—13 
results might be due in part to the intensity of preferences over income 
^^The states with the significant regression coefficients were 
Alabama (-), Arkansas (-), California (-), Florida (-), Idaho (-), 
Kansas (-) , Louisiana (+), Maryland (-), Massachusetts (-) , Michigan (-) , 
Minnesota (-), Mississippi (-), Montana (-) , New Jersey (-), North 
Dakota (-) , Ohio (-), Oklahoma (-), Pennsylvania (-), and Wisconsin (-) . 
The signs of the coefficients are given in the parentheses. 
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groups. The variable was used only in two regressions. In each of 
these regressions, there were four other measures of mobility present also. 
This might have affected the result. For the same reasoning might 
apply. In the two regressions, there were also four other measures of age. 
Also it might be possible that those over 65, even though their tax liabil­
ity is expected to decrease in the future, might not desire to burden 
future generations by postponing taxes via government borrowing. 
The signs on 12 variables were not consistent throughout the regres­
sions. Some inconsistency, namely for variables and 
P^, resulted when state dummy variables were added. The dummy variables 
might have explained some of the variation previously explained by these 
variables. The inconsistency for income variables Y , Y_ Y^ 
u—j / 
?15-25' ^ cap' ^ low' ^ 125' ^low/pop because of 
the multicollinearity that existed among these variables. The same may be 
true of the variables A^^^ and since different measures of age were 
used and closely related. 
For variables Y3.7, Y^ap' ^ low' ^ 125- ''low/pop-
set of 16 regressions, each with only one explanatory variable, was the most 
enlightening since the income variables were each run without the influ­
ence of the other income variables. For these seven variables, the signs 
were as hypothesized in this set of regressions. Variable Y^^ did not 
have the hypothesized sign. However, as explained above, the intensity of 
preferences should not be as strong in the middle-income classes, and the 
break between the middle- and high-income classes was at $25,000. 
For the other variables with inconsistent signs, it is hard to draw 
conclusions. For and i, as stated above, the difference in sign occurs 
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with the introduction of dummy variables. For A, „ the signs are incon-io—ob 
elusive. For variable three of the four signs were as predicted. 
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chapter v. summary and conclusions 
In summary, there appears to be support for Adams* theory that low-
and middle-income communities prefer debt while high-income communities 
prefer taxation. The statistical results concur with his theory espe­
cially for low- and high-income groups. The results for middle-income 
groups are not so conclusive. However, these variables were not signifi­
cant which supports Adams' contention that the intensity of preferences is 
not uniformly strong over all income groups. The results for the cumula­
tive income classes also lend some evidence to support his theory. The 
cumulative classes combining low- and middle-income classes together had 
the predicted signs, and three of the four variables were significant. The 
variable was particularly important since the implications of Adams* 
theory may be applied with the assumption of the median voter dominating. 
This variable consistently had the predicted sign and was consistently sig­
nificant. 
Two other theories were also supported by the statistical results of 
this paper, Buchanan's theory regarding capital expenditure and the theory 
of mobility. Capital expenditures were significant in every regression. 
Mobility, when measured by was significant in every regression also. 
These results do not give support to the theory that the higher the prob­
ability of the median voter leaving the community, the more he should pre­
fer debt financing. The variable M was used to try to measure the effect yr 
of the hypothesis that if the citizens of a community expect the community 
to grow, they might prefer more debt as they anticipate their tax share 
falling in the future. An alternative explanation of the significance of 
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variable M must also be considered. This variable may have reflected the yr 
effect of the general growth of the community and not mobility. If it was 
the case that reflected the expansion of public facilities in line with 
private growth, it might be expected that variables and would be 
highly correlated. This, however, was not the case. In addition, Adams' 
reasoning about wealth having no effect on postponement incentives at the 
state and local levels was supported by the fact that the wealth variable 
was never significant. 
Two theories were not supported by these statistical results. They 
were the interest rate and age. In the case of the interest rate, it 
should be noted that the proxy used for the interest race had a small vari­
ance. The small variance of this variable makes the standard error of the 
estimated coefficient large. Therefore, it is difficult to reject the null 
h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  3 = 0 -
Of the five factors added, namely R^, P^, I, and three 
were significant. These were Rp^> and I. The fact that Rp^ was sig­
nificant gives some support to the idea that the characteristics of the 
property tax, its visibility and lump-sum payments, might cause the percent 
of total revenue from property taxes to have some effect on postponement 
incentives. 
The significance of I and was not surprising. Given the problems 
present in these variables, it is not possible to attach much weight to 
their significance. 
The coefficient of was insignificant. These results do not provide 
much support to the relevance of Buchanan's "community" argument to the 
issue of debt versus tax finance. 
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More insight into the effect of the variables with the significant 
coefficients can be gained by examining their mean elasticities given in 
Table 5.1. They differ from the usual definition of elasticity in that the 
means of the dependent and independent variables, and not their levels, are 
used in the calculations as shown in Equation 5.1. 
.•N„ X. ^ X. 
n(Y, %_,) = ^  • ^  = 3,. ^  (5.1) 
Y cî^i y "
The results are to be interpreted in the usual manner, that is, a per­
cent change in the independent variable causes an n percent change in the 
dependent variable. 
Table 5.1. The mean elasticity of AD 
Variable Elasticity coefficient 
Y , -.99 
med 
K^2 2.43 
-1.34 
.13 
-.26 
^t 
M .27 yr 
The results should be read as follows: The mean elasticity of the 
change in the percent of expenditures financed via government borrowing AD 
with respect to a 1% change in, for example, median income, Y^^^, is -.99%. 
The results show that the percent of expenditures financed via govern­
ment borrowing as being sensitive to capital expenditures as a percent of 
total expenditures, taxes as a percent of total revenue, and median income. 
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The coefficients of six factors were found to be significant in the 
cross-sectional statistical analysis of tax-postponement via government 
borrowing. The completed statistical analysis gives an estimate of the 
coefficients. These estimates can be used with recent trends on the x^'s 
to discuss the probable effect on the dependent variable over time. 
The trend in the percent of expenditures financed by government bor­
rowing is shown in Table 5.2. The value of this variable has declined in 
the period 1972 to 1976. The trends in the independent variables are dis­
cussed next to see if the trends of the explanatory variables and their 
Table 5.2. Percent of expenditures financed by government borrowing, 1972-
1976* 
Year Percent 
1972 4.2 
1973 3.9 
1974 5.1 
1975 3.5 
1976 2.6 
^Calculated from: Governmental Finances, 1975-76, pp. 5 and 6. 
direction of effect are consistent with this decline in the dependent vari­
able. 
The trend in income distribution is shown in Table 5.3. This data 
shows that since 1970 median income has been increasing, the percentage of 
families in the low-income classes has been falling, and the percentage of 
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Table 5.3. Families by total money income and type of family, 1975, 1974 
(revised), and 1970^ 
All races 
All Husband-wife Female 
Year and total money income families families head 
1975 
Number (thousands) 56,245 47,318 7,482 
Percent, by type of family 100-0 84.1 13.3 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Under $3,000 4.5 2.6 16.8 
$3,000 to $4,999 7.5 5.5 19.8 
$5,000 to $6,999 8.3 7.3 14.6 
$7,000 to $9,999 12.0 12.0 18.4 
$10,000 to $11,999 8.9 9.0 8.2 
$12,000 to $14,999 13.4 14.2 8.6 
$15,000 to $24,999 30.3 33.3 11.5 
$25,000 and over 14.1 16.1 2.3 
Median income $13,719 $14,867 $6,844 
Mean income $15,546 $16,693 $8,463 
Mean income per family member $4,587 $4,844 $2,685 
1974 
Number (thousands) 55,698 47,069 7,230 
Percent, by type of family 100.0 84.5 13.0 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Under $3,000 5.0 2.9 18.6 
$3,000 to $4,999 7.7 5.8 19.7 
$5,000 to $6,999 8.8 7.7 15.6 
$7,000 to $9,999 13.8 13.2 17.4 
$10,000 to $11,999 10.1 10.4 8.3 
$12,000 to $14,999 14.1 15.1 7.7 
$15,000 to $24,999 28.6 31.4 10.4 
$25,000 and over 11.9 13.5 2.1 
Median income : 
Current dollars $12,902 $13,923 $6,488 
Constant (1975) dollars $14,081 $15,196 $7,081 
^Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
Series P-60, Nos. 80 and 103; and unpublished Current Population Survey 
data. 
^Includes other male headed families. 
^Since medians were calculated using more detailed intervals than 
those shown above, they will not be the same as those calculated using the 
above intervals. 
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Table 5.3. (continued) 
All races 
All ^ Husband-wife Female 
Year and total money income families families head 
Mean income: 
Current dollars $14,711 $15,767 $8,106 
Constant (1975) dollars $16,056 $17,208 $8,847 
Mean income per family member: 
Current dollars $4,303 $4,546 $2,530 
Constant (1975) dollars $4,696 $4,962 $2,761 
1970 
Number (thousands) 52,227 44,964 6,001 
Percent, by type of family 100.0 86.1 11.5 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Under $3,000 8.9 6.4 27.4 
$3,000 to $4,999 10.3 8.7 21.8 
$5,000 to $6,999 11.8 11.0 17.4 
$7,000 to $9,999 19.9 20.5 16.2 
$10,000 to $11,999 12.7 13.5 6.5 
$12,000 to $14,999 14.1 15.4 5.4 
$15,000 to $24,999 17.7 19.5 4.7 
$25,000 and over 4.6 5.1 0.7 
Median income: 
Current dollars $9,867 $10,516 $5,093 
Constant (1975) dollars $13,676 $14,576 $7,059 
Mean income: 
Current dollars $11,106 $11,774 $6,213 
Constant (1975) dollars $15,394 $16,320 $8,612 
Mean income per family member: 
Current dollars $3,083 $3,220 $1,867 
Constant (1975) dollars $4,273 $4,463 $2,588 
families in the high-income bracket. $25,000 and over, has been increasing. 
Table 5.4 shows the trend for families below the poverty level. The per­
cent fell from the 1970 level until 1974 but increased slightly in 1975. 
These results, taken with the hypothesized signs of the income variables, 
tend to suggest that the overall preference of individuals might be shift­
ing somewhat away from government borrowing. 
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Table 5.4. Percent of families below the poverty level^ 
Year Percent 
1970 12.6 
1971 12.5 
1972 11.9 
1973 11.1 
1974 11.6 
1975 12.3 
^Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, 
Series P-60, Nos. 97 and 98. 
Also, inflation pushes people into higher marginal tax brackets, even 
if real incomes do not rise, thereby reducing the percent of people with 
reason to prefer borrowing. Since Adams' theory depends on the interest 
r , the personal borrowing rate approximated by the FHA mortgage rates are 
P 
given in Table 5.5. As is illustrated in Table 5.5, no trend can be seen. 
The next variable to be discussed is Rp^, the percent of revenue from 
the property tax. The trends for Rp^ are given in Table 5.6. Rp^ has a 
positive regression coefficient. This might lead one to expect a decrease 
in preferences for tax postponement as R^^ has decreased over time. 
Capital expenditures as a percent of total expenditures have remained 
about the same but show a slight decline in the years from 1972 to 1976 as 
seen in Table 5.7. Capital expenditures were also expected to have a posi­
tive effect on tax postponement. This fact implies a tendency towards a 
preference for less borrowing. 
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Table 5.5. Ratio of interest rates, 1973 to 1978^ 
Year 
1973 .57 
1974 .69 
1975 .69 
1976 .62 
1977 .58 
1978 .59 
^Calculated from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monetary Trends, 
June 28, 1978, p. 10. 
Table 5-6. Taxes as a percent of total revenue and property taxes as a 
percent of total revenue, 1972 to 1976 
Year 
Taxes as a 
percent of 
total revenue 
Property taxes 
as a percent of 
total revenue 
1972-73 37.5 24.1 
1973-74 36.8 23.1 
1974-75 35.4 21.9 
1975-76 34.9 21.2 
^Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 
1972-73, p. 2; 1973-1974, p. 2; 1974-1975, p. 1; and 1975-1976, pp. 1 and 5. 
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Table 5.7. Governmental expenditures for capital outlays as a percent of 
total expenditures, 1972-1976^ 
Year Percent 
1972-73 19.1 
1973-74 19.1 
1974-75 19.1 
1975-76 17.6 
^Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 
1975-76, p. 6. 
Another variable that proved significant represented mobility. There 
is evidence that the one-year rate for residential mobility has been gradu­
ally declining in the United States. Data on residential mobility from 
1948 to 1971 showed few statistically significant year-to-year changes in 
the rate of moving. The average rate of residential mobility for the four 
years from 1968 to 1971 was less than the same rate for the period 1958 to 
1961. The average rate for 1958 to 1961 was 20.1% compared to 19.1% for 
1968 to 1971. For 1972 to 1975, the rate was 17.7. It was confirmed that 
the more mobile the residents of a community were, the more they should 
prefer government borrowing. These trends imply there might be a tendency 
once again for movement away from preferences for borrowing (48). 
The significance of intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total 
revenue and the percent of total revenue from taxes cannot be given much 
theoretical weight, but the trends for these two variables are given in 
Tables 5.6 and 5.8. The increase in intergovernmental revenue as a percent 
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Table 5.8. Intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total revenue, 1972 
to 1976^ 
Year Percent 
1972-73 31.6 
1973-74 31.5 
1974-75 32.9 
1975-76 33.3 
^Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, City Government Finances, 1972-73, 
p. 2; 1973-74, p. 2; 1974-75, p. 1; and 1975-76, p. 1. 
of total revenue implies.a shifting of preferences away from borrowing as a 
percent of total spending. The decrease in the percent of total revenue 
from taxes leads to the opposite implications. 
The trends in the six variables with significant coefficients imply 
that there has been, in the 1972-1976 period, conflicting forces on prefer­
ences for borrowing versus tax finance. Therefore, the estimated 3^*s and 
the observed trends of these variables are used below to compute a 
predicted change in the dependent variable for the period 1972 to 1976. 
The equation 5.2 will be used for the estimation of dD^^.yg 
•^72-76 • + v" + h'^72 + «.2) 
an,. - (-.00001)(2201) + (.00018)(-2.9) + (-.14947)(-2.6) /z—/o 
+ (-.00151)(1.7) + (.28584)(-1.5) + (.00116)(1.1) = -.064 
The actual change in D for the period 1972 to 1976 was -.016 as was 
illustrated in Table 5.2. The net direction of the combined effect of 
these six variables is consistent with the observed decrease in the percent 
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of expenditure postponed via government borrowing. The recent trends are 
also consistent with the implications of the cross-sectional findings of 
Chapter IV. 
This paper analyzed tax postponement incentives for individuals in 
municipalities. The significant coefficients give some insight into the 
preferences of individuals for borrowing versus tax finance. Many cities 
are facing financial crises, and how cities meet these crises presumably 
will at least in part reflect the preferences of their citizens. 
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